Author: Jim Chapman
In United States v. Davis, ___ 4th ____2024 WL 4432499 (7th Cir. Oct. 7, 2024), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana’s denial of Defendant Michael Davis’ motion to suppress. In its Opinion, the Seventh Circuit held that the District Court had properly denied Davis’ motion to suppress because the search conducted by law enforcement officers was incident to Davis’ arrest for felony intimidation in violation of Indiana law. The Seventh Circuit also found that the District Court had correctly determined that the officers’ search of Davis’ vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement based upon the automobile exception. The relevant facts are as follows.
On the morning of February 22, 2022, in Gary, Indiana, Defendant Michael Davis began beating and kicking at the door of his former girlfriend, A.C., and her four children. Davis had gone to A.C.’s home in order to retrieve some clothes that he had left in the back of her minivan. A.C. answered the door, but she refused to return the clothes to Davis until Davis first returned her jewelry to her. Angered by this response, Davis picked up a brick and gestured toward A.C.’s minivan. Thereafter, A.C. called the police. Although an officer responded, the officer declined to facilitate a property exchange and instructed A.C. to file a report.
Davis left shortly after the police did, but his behavior continued to escalate. A.C. was pregnant, and Davis sent a text message to A.C. in which he threatened to kill her baby. Fearful of Davis’s increasing hostility, A.C. called off their plan to reconvene at the house in order to exchange the clothes and jewelry. A.C. then instructed her children to call 911 if Davis returned.
A few hours later, Davis returned to the house while A.C. was preparing her kids for school. At 7:12 a.m., A.C.’s 15-year-old daughter called 911. Audibly distressed, A.C.’s daughter told the 911 officer that “there’s a man here and he’s trying to kill us.” She urged the officer to please hurry up.” A.C.’s daughter explained that Davis had threatened her mom and had an assault rifle in his car. She also described the clothes that Davis was wearing, and she gave the officer Davis’ name. She then let the 911 operator know that her family was leaving home for the police station in a brown Honda Odessey and told the officer that Davis drove a tan GMC Terrain.
Sgt. Manuel responded to the 911 call. Dispatch had informed Sgt. Manuel, via radio and through written emergency notes, that there was a “male threatening to kill a pregnant female, apparently he has an assault rifle in the car.” Dispatch also communicated the description of Davis and his SUV given by A.C.’s daughter to Sgt. Manuel. Finally, the dispatch officer updated Sgt. Manuel when A.C. and her family left their home, providing Sgt. Manuel with a description of the family’s minivan.
Approximately ten minutes later, Sgt. Manuel spotted Davis’s tan GMC driving behind A.C.’s brown Honda. After A.C. hailed him and gestured to Davis’s SUV, Sgt. Manuel pulled them both over. Sgt. Manuel asked Davis to exit his vehicle, patted him down, confirmed his identity, and handcuffed him. Sgt. Manuel then radioed for backup. Thereafter, Officers Vonbank and McCoy responded.
After handcuffing Davis, Sgt. Manuel searched Davis’ vehicle. During the two-day suppression hearing, Sgt. Manuel testified that he did not formally arrest Davis or search his car until after Officer Vonbank interviewed A.C. and confirmed the allegations in the 911 call. However, Officer Vonbank, Davis, and A.C. testified that Sgt. Manuel arrested Davis and searched his car before Vonbank completed his interview.
Regardless, Sgt. Manuel found a loaded, AR-style shotgun with an obliterated serial number in Davis’ car. Davis was subsequently charged with being a felon in unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of federal law. During the course of the proceedings, Davis filed a motion to suppress the firearm and his subsequent post-arrest statement, contending that the officers had unlawfully searched his vehicle. As noted above, the District Court conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing on Davis’ motion to suppress. Ultimately, the District Court denied Davis’ motion, finding that the warrantless search fell within both the search incident to arrest and the automobile exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Davis, then, entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion, and this timely appeal followed.
The Seventh Circuit began its consideration of Davis’ appeal by noting that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. The Seventh Circuit noted that either exception at issue in this case (i.e., the search incident to arrest and the automobile exception) could justify the warrantless search of Davis’ vehicle. Davis argued that neither exception applied and that the District Court erred in concluding otherwise.
As for the first exception, Davis argued that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest him as the search incident to arrest exception requires. As for the second exception, Davis argued that it was reasonable to believe that his vehicle contained evidence of a crime, as both the search incident to arrest and automobile exceptions require. Therefore, Davis asserted that the District Court erred in finding that the exceptions applied and erred in denying his motion to suppress.
The Seventh Circuit rejected both of Davis’ arguments. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit explained that officers may search an automobile incident to the lawful arrest of its recent occupant under two circumstances: (1) when the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or (2) when it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. The search incident to arrest exception derives from dual concerns for officer safety and evidence preservation. However, warrantless searches incident to arrest are permissible only when the underlying arrest is lawful. But, a warrantless arrest does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment when supported by probable cause.
The Seventh Circuit continued that officers have probable cause to arrest when the facts and circumstances known to them reasonably support a belief that the individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. So, when officers make an arrest for a violation of state law, probable cause depends on the elements of the predicate criminal offense(s) as defined by state law.
In this case, Davis noted the factual ambiguity about when his detention morphed into an arrest and whether officers spoke with A.C. before arresting him to argue that the District Court erred in finding probable cause. The Seventh Circuit responded that Davis’ argument misunderstood the District Court’s ruling because the District Court had assumed—without deciding—that Davis was under arrest for intimidation prior to Officer Vonbank’s conversation with A.C. and found probable cause to arrest regardless.
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the District Court’s factual determination. At the time that he handcuffed Davis, Sgt. Manuel knew from radio communication and written emergency dispatch notes that a 911 caller had reported a male threatening to kill them, who stood outside their home, with an assault rifle in his car. Sgt. Manuel also knew the man’s name was Michael Davis and that Davis drove a tan GMC Terrain. Additionally, Sgt. Manuel knew that A.C. and her family had fled their home in a brown Honda Odyssey. The Seventh Circuit stated that eyewitness and victim reports establishing the elements of a crime, absent credibility concerns, almost always suffice to find probable cause to arrest. The Seventh Circuit found that A.C.’s daughter’s report to the 911 officer, which Sgt. Manuel corroborated, constituted probable cause to arrest Davis for felony intimidation, regardless of when he was placed under arrest, thereby negating the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for the search of Davis’ vehicle.
As for the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, Davis argued that Sgt. Manuel lacked a sufficient quantum of suspicion to search his vehicle. Davis’ argument took aim at the applicability of both the search incident to arrest and automobile exceptions to the warrant requirement.
The Seventh Circuit stated that these two exceptions are interrelated but are not identical. Officers may search a vehicle incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that the car contains evidence of the offense of arrest. The automobile exception to the warrant requirement is not tied to an arrest but permits an officer to search a vehicle without a warrant if the search is supported by probable cause regardless of any arrest.
In this case, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the District Court that Sgt. Manuel’s search was supported by probable cause. As a result, the search met the requirements of both exceptions. Probable cause to search a vehicle exists when, based on the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. The probable cause inquiry is objective. The probable cause inquiry asks whether the events which occurred leading up to the stop or search viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer support a finding of probable cause. Credible, corroborated reports from victims and witnesses can also establish probable cause to search.
Here, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the District Court that the dispatch officer’s report, along with Sgt. Manuel’s rapid corroboration of Davis’s identity, vehicle, and proximity to A.C., established probable cause to believe that Davis’s vehicle contained evidence of intimidation. In particular, Sgt. Manuel had probable cause to search the SUV for the assault rifle, as evidence that Davis had intentionally placed A.C. and her family in fear he would fulfill his threat to kill her baby. Contrary to Davis’s contention, a suspect need not brandish a firearm for it to be evidence of intimidation because the probable cause inquiry is a commonsense examination of the totality of the circumstances. When a victim reports a threat of violence and expresses fear that the threat maker is armed, officers may reasonably infer that the suspect used the weapon to intimidate. Those officers may then conclude the weapon is evidence of intimidation.
In sum, the Seventh Circuit held that the officers’ search of Davis’s car was lawful, falling within both the search incident to arrest and automobile exceptions to the warrant requirement. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of Davis’ motion to suppress.
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